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Langer: Evidence - The Attorney-Client Privilege: Nearly Breached - Swidl

EVIDENCE-The Attorney-Client Privilege: Nearly Breached.
Swidler & Berlin v. UnitedStates, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
INTRODUCTION

In July 1993, Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr. met
with James Hamilton, with the law firm of Swidler and Berlin, to seek legal
representation regarding his involvement in the dismissal of White House
Travel Office employees. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide.2 While
investigating the Travel Office firings, a federal grand jury subpoenaed the
handwritten notes Hamilton took during the meeting? The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to enforce the subpoena,
concluding the handwritten notes were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege.! The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, saying the district court read both privileges too
broadly and remanded for further proceedings! The appellate court reasoned
the attorney-client privilege "obstructs the truth-finding process, and should be
construed narrowly." Accordingly, the court held the attorney-client privilege
should be qualified after the death of the client in criminal proceedings," saying
such a restriction of the privilege would create only a nominal chilling effect

1. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2083 (1998); see generally Brief for the
United States, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No. 97-1192) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States].
The dismissal of the Travel Office employees produced an immediate controversy about why the employees had been fired and why the White House had involved the FBI in the matter.... The White House ...responded by conducting an
internal investigation into the firings. On July 2, 1993, the White House issued a
public report of that investigation. Chief of Staff Thomas F. McLarty reprimanded
four White House officers and employees (including David Watkins and Associate
Counsel William Kennedy) for their actions in connection with the firings. Although
Mr. Foster was not reprimanded, the White House report recounted his apparent role
in the events leading to the firings.
Controversy over the Travel Office firings did not abate with the White
House's report and the publicly announced reprimands. On July 2, 1993, the President signed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993 . . . which required the
General Accounting Office to conduct a review of the firings. At the same time,
calls were issued for further congressional or federal law enforcement investigation
into the matter.
On Sunday, July 11, 1993, Mr. Foster met with petitioner James Hamilton, an
attorney at Swidler & Berlin (also a petitioner).
Id. at 3-4.
2. Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2083.
3. Id.
4. Id.See Brief for theUnited States, supra note 1, at 7 (noting the judge made this ruling without
elaboration or explanation).
5. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
6. Id. at 233.
7. Id. at 234.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1999

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 34 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 9

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIV

on communications between clients and attorneys.'
Counsel for Swidler & Berlin then submitted a suggestion for rehearing
en banc.9 This motion was denied and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the attorney-client
privilege survives the death of the client and rejecting the exception offered by
the court of appeals."°
This case note examines the Swidler decision and focuses on the Su-

preme Court's justification of the attorney-client privilege. The note explains the history of the attorney-client privilege by examining the development and the modern status of the privilege. Next, it summarizes the de-

cisions of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in this case. This note
concludes the Supreme Court made the proper determination in this case,
but recognizes the lack of clear precedent and examines the Court's choice
of policy justification for the privilege. The note also suggests the privilege

may be susceptible to challenges in future posthumous application cases."
BACKGROUND
Development of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest privileges for confiden-

tial communications, originated around the time that testimonial compulsion
was authorized during the reign of Elizabeth L.2 At its inception, the privilege was rooted in the attorney's honor and oath to keep the client's secrets
(hereinafter the oath and honor theory)." As the eighteenth century neared,
the courts' search for truth overshadowed the attorney's honor" and there

8. Id. at 233.
9. See In re Sealed Case, 129 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
10. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081,2084(1998).
11. The reader should keep in mind that Swidler construes the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the
federal common law privilege. The treatment of the attorney-client privilege under Wyoming (or any
other state) rules is not controlled by this decision.
12. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (MeNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore asserts that the privilege
probably did not come into existence before testimonial compulsion because there would have been little
need for the privilege and the privilege was a natural exception to the right of testimonial compulsion.
Id.
13. Id. (citing Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401,406 (C.P. 1836)).
14. 1 J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. Until
the later 1700s, courts allowed witnesses to invoke their "honor among gentlemen" as a basis for not
revealing the secrets entrusted to them. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, at § 2286. However, this view was
abandoned in the Duchess of Kingston case where the Duchess was accused of bigamy. Lord Barrington,
a friend of the Duchess, refused to say whether the Duchess had admitted to the first marriage. The court
announced that "it is the judgment of this House that you [Lord Barrington] are bound by law to answer
all such questions as shall be put to you." Id. § 2286 n.16. Wigmore defined the common law rule saying
in a court ofjustice."
"[n]o pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth
Id. § 2286.
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was no longer "any moral delinquency or public odium in breaking one's
pledge under force of the law."'" This emphasis on "truth" threatened the
existence of the privilege until a new justification emerged: "providing
subjectively for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal
advisor.""11
This new theory, concerned with encouraging candor between the client and the attorney (hereinafter the utilitarian theory), first appeared in the
early 1700s, but coexisted with the oath and honor theory until the mid1800s." As the two theories struggled for predominance, three main differences stood out. First, under the oath and honor theory the attorney took the
oath; therefore, the attorney asserted the privilege.' In 1801, the utilitarian
theory began to make its mark when Lord Eldon declared that the privilege
belonged to the client. 9 Second, the oath and honor theory limited the
privilege to cover only those communications related to the litigation at
bar. ° Conversely, the utilitarian theory extended the privilege to communications irrespective of litigation, and in relation to any consultation for legal
advice.,' Third, under the oath and honor theory the privilege could be
waived by the attorney.22 Today, "the lawyer has an ethical obligation to
claim [the attorney-client privilege] when necessary to protect the interests
of the client."",
The utilitarian theory continues to be the primary justification for the
privilege." The utilitarian view of the attorney-client privilege is based on
the rationale that full disclosure is necessary for the attorney to competently
represent the client in a complex legal system." In order to obtain full dis-

15. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290.
16. Id. See also I MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87, at 314 (noting the loss of facts that results from
the privilege is outweighed by the benefits to justice derived from franker disclosure). While this theory

(which is also the modem theory) focuses on the subjective freedom of the client in consulting the attorney, the theory is justified because of the benefits which accrue to society from effective legal representation. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. This emphasis on looking to the benefits to society
rather than emphasizing the attorney's oath of honor enabled the privilege to withstand challenges from
the judiciary's search for truth. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290.
17. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. §2290 n.8 (quoting Wright v. Mayer, 31 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch. 1801)).
Id. § 2290.
See id. ("[T]he shackles of the earlier precedents were not finally thrown off until the decade of

1870.").
22. ld_
23.

2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 200 (2d ed.

1994).
24. Simon J.Frankel, The Attorney-Client PrivilegeAfter the Death of the Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 45, 49-50 (1992). The Supreme Court adopted this rationale, saying the purpose of the privilege
is to promote "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote

broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
25.

1 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87 at 314.
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closure, "the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal adviser
must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on

the client's consent.""
The attorney-client privilege has not been without its opponents. As
early as 1827, Jeremy Bentham adamantly opposed the privilege on the
basis that it only protected the guilty." He opined that an innocent person
would have nothing to fear if his attorney was forced to testify regarding

their conversations.Y This simplistic approach seems antithetical to the
American system of justice and its goal of ensuring legal counsel to every-

one, including the guilty. 9 It also ignores the difficult problem civil cases
present where guilt or fault may be shared by more than one party."
Unlike Bentham, modem critics do not attack the very idea of the

privilege, but focus their criticism on the privilege's efficacy in achieving
candor between the client and the attorney." "Critics ... commonly assert
that people typically know little or nothing about their privilege and that

even if they did, the knowledge would rarely alter their communication behavior.",, Many critics demand empirical evidence to justify the privilege."
Those making this demand are often dismayed at the poor response from the

academic community in pursuing such research." However, "such evidence
may prove undemonstrable by the reason of the privilege itself."" This lack

26.
27.
28.
29.

8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291.
See id. (quoting Bentham's arguments).
Id.
Bentham was quite unsympathetic to the guilty.

If it be your object not to find the prisoner guilty, there cannot be a better way than
refusing to hear the person who is most likely to know of his guilt, if it exist. The
[attorney-client privilege] rule is perfectly well adapted to its end: but is that end
the true end of procedure? This question surely requires no answer.
Id.
30. Id. Bentham argued that doing away with the privilege would only deter the guilty from seeking
legal counsel because the innocent would know they would have nothing to fear if their attorney was
forced to testify regarding their conversations. Id. However, Wigmore points out that in civil cases there
is "no hard and fast line between guilt and innocence" and even if there was "it does not happen that all
the acts and facts on one side have been wholly right and lawful and all of those on the other side wholly
wrong and unlawful." id Because of these mixtures of right and wrong a person would not always be
able to confidently confide in an attorney with no fear of disclosure. Id.
31. See I MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87 at 315. ("[N]one can deny the privilege's unfortunate
tendency to suppress the truth, and it has commonly been urged that it is only the greater benefit of
increased candor which justifies the continuation of the privilege.").
32. Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications (pt. II. Modes of Analysis: The Theories
and Justifications of Privileged Communications), 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1474 nn.19-20 (1985)
[hereinafter Modes ofAnalysis].
33. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 353 n.7 (1989). See also
Modes of Analysis, supra note 32, at 1474 ("The most frequent and most powerful attack simply challenges the notion that existing privileges actually encourage communications.").
34. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 353-54.
35. I MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87 at 315.
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of research may stem from the difficulty of proving the privilege's effectiveness, or a feeling that the issues are more theoretical than real"6 In light
of the few studies that have been conducted on this topic, a court would be
reluctant to curtail the privilege on the basis of empirical research alone."
The American Law Institute suggests an exception curtailing the privilege
after the client's death would probably require legislation?,
Modern Status of the Privilege
1. Policy Justifications
The primary justification of the privilege is the utilitarian justification?'
This rationale protects evidence covered by the privilege "on the grounds
that the overall system of justice will actually function more effectively if
clients have the protection of the privilege."'" Accordingly, the privilege
protects not just clients individually, but society generally.' Most importantly, since the focus is on the benefits that accrue to society, the justification avoids the difficult balancing of competing individual concerns that
may arise when someone seeks information protected by the privilege.2
Rather than concern itself with which individual concern should receive
priority, a court is able to say society's interest in the privilege is superior to
any individual's interest.
The lack of empirical evidence proving the privilege promotes full and
frank communication has led some commentators to justify the privilege on
other grounds." "A rationale increasingly espoused by commentators is that
privileges are a recognition by society of the importance of privacy in certain relationships, so that regardless of 'necessity,' confidentiality will be
protected."' This emerging rationale (hereinafter the privacy theory) has
gained some support among commentators, but has received little recogni4
tion from courts.
1

36. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 353 n.8.
37. See, e.g, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S Ct. 2081, 2087 n.4 (1998) (noting that the
empirical evidence on the privilege is limited and inconclusive).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No.

1, 1996) (saying that a compelling argument can be made for an exception to the privilege in cases where
the protected communication "bears substantially upon an issue of pivotal significance for a claim or

defense of aparty.").

39. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
40. Frankel, supra note 24, at 51.

41. Id.

42. See Modes ofAnalysis, supra note 32, at 1474.
43. Frankel, supra note 24, at 53. See also Modes ofAnalysis, supra note 32, at 1480.
44. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 5 (2 ed. 1989).

45. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87 at 315-16 (saying this rationale has "achieved only very
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Unlike the utilitarian justification, which focuses on the benefits to
society in general, the privacy rationale focuses on the individual's right to

privacy." Privacy is viewed as a necessary component of personal autonomy and an end in itself.'17 Because of the importance of this right, a compelled disclosure of information entrusted to the attorney is viewed as inherently wrong." Some commentators, anxious to avoid balancing societal and
individual concerns, have espoused the privacy rationale, claiming the rights
of the individual are the paramount concern to be protected."

Others argue these two justifications can be combined to give greater
support to the privilege.1' Some have suggested the privacy rationale is a
supplemental justification which responds to the limitations of the utilitarian
rationale." Others have suggested the two theories can be "seen as different

views of a common justification for the privilege.",, Despite the apparent
compatibility of the theories, courts have generally treated the two justifications as mutually exclusive." "At the present time it seems most realistic to
describe the attorney-client privilege as supported in part by its traditional

utilitarian justification, and in part by the integral role it is perceived to play
in the adversary system itself.""
2. Cases-Extent of Privilege Recognized
Of the few United States Supreme Court cases that have construed the
attorney-client privilege, Hunt v. Blackburn, Glover v. Patten, and Upjohn
Co. v. United States are notable." The earliest of these cases, Hunt v. Black-

little recognition in the courts as a supporting, much less a sufficient, justification for the attorney-client
privilege."). See also Frankel, supra note 24, at 53 n.41 (contending that judicial opinions rarely discuss
the privacy rationale).
46. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 53-54.
47. See Modes ofAnalysis, supra note 32, at 1481.
48. Id.

49. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications (pt. In. Attorney-Client Privilege),
98 HARV. L. REv. 1501, 1504 (1985) ("The non-utilitarian theorists argue for expansion of the privilege,
focusing on the rights that the privilege protects and abandoning caution concerning the cost of fully
protecting those rights.").
50. See id. (arguing the utilitarian and non-utilitarian justifications can be incorporated into one
broad framework). See also Modes of Analysis, supra note 32, at 1484 (contending that the two theories
are compatible and share similar methodologies).
51. Modes ofAnalysis, supranote 32, at 1484.
52. Frankel, supra note 24, at 55.
53. See Modes of Analysis, supra note 32, at 1484 ("[B]ccause they [courts] accept one of two false
dichotomies: (1) the dichotomy between justifications that advance collective interests and justifications
that protect individual interest, or (2) the dichotomy between instrumental and noninstrumental rationales. Because both dichotomies ultimately collapse, it is possible to reconcile the traditional justification
with the privacy rationale and to encompass both rationales within a fill utilitarian framework.").
54. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87 at316.

55. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897); Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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burn, involved a title dispute over certain property.' In that case the defendant sought to suppress testimony by her attorney, claiming the attorneyclient privilege barred his testimony on matters relating to her allegations
that he had misled and misadvised her." The Supreme Court recognized the
purpose of the privilege as being founded "upon the necessity.., of the aid
of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."'"
In Glover v. Patten, the Supreme Court addressed several questions
regarding an estate, one of which was whether or not the communications
made by the deceased to her lawyer were privileged. 9 The Court ruled "in a
suit between devisees under a will, statements made by the deceased to
counsel respecting the execution of the will or other similar documents, are
not privileged."' The Court recognized "such communications might be
privileged if offered by third persons to establish claims against the estate."6'
Again the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of the privilege, saying:
[I]t is out of regard to the interest of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on
without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of
the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations
which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege
did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal
resources. Deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not
venture to consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell his
counselor half his case.62
In the midst of adopting this testamentary exception to the privilege, the
Court stated "[tihat the privilege does not in all cases terminate with the
death of the party, I entertain no doubt."6'
In Upjohn Company v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the

56. 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
57. Id. at 470.
58. Id.
59. 165 U.S. 394, 406 (1897).
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id.at 406-07 (quoting Lord Brougham in Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 621 (Ch.
1833)).
63. Id 407 (quoting Vice Chancellor Turner in Russell v. Jackson, 68 Eng. Rep. 558, 560 (V.C.
1851)). This comment is particularly curious in light of the Supreme Court's assertion in Swidler that the
Glover court expressly assumed the privilege continued after the client's death. See Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2085 (1998).
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scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context." In holding
the "control group" test' too narrowly construed the privilege," the Court

made several observations regarding the attorney-client privilege. First, the
Court reinforced its earlier statement of the purpose of the privilege saying
"[ilts purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of the law and administration of justice."' " Secondly, the Court
emphasized the importance of certainty in allowing "the attorney and client
S..

to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions

will be protected."" Finally, the Court made the observation that "the privilege only protects disclosure of communication; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the
attorney."69
Exceptions to the Privilege
Generally, the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege have been
limited to discreet areas. Exceptions arise in cases where a client seeks legal

advice to further a plan to commit a crime or tort (crime-fraud exception)
and cases where a communication is relevant to an issue between parties
who assert competing claims through the same deceased client regarding

estate matters (testamentary exception)."0 Other exceptions apply to a few
specific situations." Outside of these narrow exceptions the attorney-client

64. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
65. The control group test limits protection of the attorney-client privilege to those officers and
agents who are responsible for directing the company's actions in response to legal advice. See id. at
390.
66. Id. at 390-97.
67. Id. at 389.
68. Id. at 393. ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts is little better than no privilege at all.").
69. Id. at 395.
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A
fact is one thing and a communication concerning the fact is an entirely different
thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, "What did you say or
write to the attorney?" but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.
Id. at 395-96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1962)).
70. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d) (amended 1986), 13A U.L.A. 519-20 (1994).
71. Id. Those situations are: (I) cases involving a communication relevant to an issue of breach of
duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer; (2) cases involving a communication
relevant to an issue concerning an attested document of which the lawyer is an attesting witness; (3)
cases where a communication is relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if
made by any of them to a lawyer whom they have retained in common when offered in an action between any of such clients; and (4) cases involving a communication between a public officer or agency
and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or action and the
court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to proc-
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privilege has a tendency to suppress the truth finding process.'2 For this reason the court of appeals in this case suggested the need for confidentiality
and the need for the privileged information should be balanced."
PRINCIPAL CASE

The district court reviewed, in camera, the notes James Hamilton had
made. The court concluded the notes were protected from disclosure by the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.7' The court of appeals reversed, finding the district court read both privileges too broadly."
In a two to one decision, the three judge panel held the attorney-client
privilege should be qualified in certain criminal cases where the need for the
information outweighed the deceased client's confidentiality interests."6
The court noted the limited number of cases recognizing the attorneyclient privilege after the client's death in cases other than testamentary exception cases." The court stated that the few cases which do deal with the
operation of the privilege after the client's death give very little explanation
for their decisions.' The court asserted, citing only the opinions of commentators," there would be little chilling effect on a client's candor if the
privilege is curtailed in certain criminal matters.w The court also noted the

ess the claim or conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest. Id.
72. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 87. See also EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 44, at 5 (noting
that the attorney-client privilege should be strictly construed because the privilege itself is an exception
to the general principle of full disclosure).
73. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

74. Id. at231.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 234.

77. Id. at 231. The court reported one commentator's finding that 95% of cases examined involving
the application of the attomey-client privilege after the client's death were testamentary disputes. Id
(citing Frankel, supra note 24, at 58 n,65).
78. Id. at 232. Those who favor an eternal duration for the privilege seldom do much by way of

justifying this in terms of policy. 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5498 (1986).
79. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232 (noting that other than Wigmore, most commentators "support some measure of post-death curtailment."). See, e.g., 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 78, § 5498

("One would have to attribute a Pharaoh-like concern for immortality to suppose that the typical client
has much concern for how posterity may view his communications."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("Permitting disclosure of a

decedent's confidential communications in such an exceptional case would do little to inhibit clients
from confiding in their lawyers."); See also I MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 94 at 350 ('This [terminating the privilege at death] could not to any substantial degree lessen the encouragement for free
disclosure which is the purpose of the privilege."); 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 23, § 199

("Few clients are much concerned with what will happen sometime after the death that everyone expects
but few anticipate in an immediate or definite sense.").
80. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1999

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 34 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIV

cost of protecting communications after death is high.'
The dissent found no reason to depart from the common law, saying

traditional justifications were persuasive enough to sustain the privilege
beyond the client's death. 2 The dissent claimed an uncertain privilege is

little better than no privilege at all," and the privilege would be undermined
if its application was contingent upon a judge's evaluation at an unascertainable time in the future.'"
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the court of
appeals and held the notes at issue were protected by the attorney-client
privilege." The Court noted that only two cases held the attorney-client
privilege did not survive the death of the client." The Court said "[t]he great

body of caselaw supports, either by holding or considered dicta, the position
that the privilege does survive in a case such as the present one."'

The

Court placed the burden of proof on the independent counsel to prove that
"reason and experience" require the attorney-client privilege to be limited in
this case."
Before concluding the independent counsel failed to meet this burden,
the Court addressed several arguments. The Court first attacked the argu-

ment analogizing the proposed exception in criminal cases to the testamentary exception by saying the testamentary exception furthered the intent of
the client while the proposed criminal exception did not. In response to the
independent counsel's proposition that allowing the attorney to testify
would only reveal information that would have been obtained by a grant of
immunity to the client while he was alive, the Court said the privilege is

broader than the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination."
Additionally, the Court dismissed the argument that the privilege results in a

81. Id. The court of appeals also discussed the work product privilege, but the Supreme Court did not
reach this issue. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2084 n.1 (1998).
82. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 238-39 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 239 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
84. Id. at 240.
85. Swidler& Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2083 (1998).
86. Id.at 2084. The two courts which have held that the attorney-client privilege should not prevent
disclosure of communication by a deceased client were the lower court in the principal case and a Pennsylvania state appellate court. See In re Sealed Case, 129 F.3d 637, 232 n.1 (DC. Cir. 1997); Cohen v.
Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). In Cohen, the court found that the interests of
justice required the disclosure of a deceased cabdriver's communication to his attorney admitting liability for the plaintiff's injury. See Cohen, 357 A.2d at 689.
87. Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084.
88. Id. at 2085 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501: "Mhe privilege of a witness.., shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.").

89. Id. at 2085-86.
90. Id. at 2086.
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loss of evidence by saying the loss of evidence is more apparent than real
because, without the privilege, the communication probably would not have

been made.'
The Court used the utilitarian policy justification for the privilege by
citing the Upjohn case. The Court found "[tihe privilege is intended to encourage 'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients

and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
the administration of justice."''9 The Court also set forth three reasons to

justify the posthumous application of the privilege: (1) knowing communications will remain confidential even after death encourages the client to
communicate fully and frankly with counsel; (2) while the fear of disclosure
and the consequent withholding of information from counsel may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to assume it vanishes altogether; and (3) clients
may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to
friends or family. 9'
The Court discounted commentators' views to the contrary, stating the
need to encourage full disclosure was a strong enough reason to justify the
survival of the privilege beyond the client's death.? Finally, the Court refused to reach the issue of whether an exception should be made in cases
where a defendant's constitutional rights were implicated, asserting that
such exceptional circumstances did not exist in this case."
Conversely, the dissent concluded that although the attorney-client
privilege normally survives the death of the client, "a criminal defendant's
right to exculpatory evidence ... may, where the testimony is not available
from other sources, override a client's posthumous interest in confidentiality." 91 The dissent reached this conclusion by first contending that all rules
of evidence must be adapted to the successful development of truth.' 7 The
dissent noted that "[a] privilege should operate... only where 'necessary to
achieve its purpose."' The dissent said the interests of the client are greatly
diminished at death while the cost of recognizing an absolute posthumous

91. Id. at 2087.
92. Id. at 2084. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981)).
93. Id. at 2086.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2087 (acknowledging Swidler & Berlin's concession that exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might warrant breaching the privilege).

96. Id.at 2088 (O'Connor, I.,dissenting) The dissent also stated that acompelling law enforcement
need for information may override the client's posthumous interests. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined the dissent.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2088 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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privilege are very high." Next, the dissent asserted that current exceptions to
the privilege are not necessarily consistent with encouraging full and frank
communication, but they demonstrate the privilege is inapplicable under
certain circumstances in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the
adversary system.'' Finally, the dissent pointed out that the common law
does not specifically provide that the attorney-client privilege remains absolute after the death of the client."°"
ANALYSIS

The Court's decision may appear to be the only logical resolution of
this case, especially in light of the common law presumption that the privilege survives the client's death. However, misconceptions regarding the
protections of the attorney-client privilege cast doubt on the contention that
altering the privilege would discourage full and frank communications by
clients., 2 These misconceptions suggest the extent of the privilege should be
re-evaluated.' 3
The Court's opinion raises several important issues. Perhaps the most

surprising element of the opinion is the lack of precedent addressing the
posthumous application of the privilege. Secondly, while the privacy rationale behind the privilege is receiving increasing attention by commentators,
the Court's avoidance of that policy justification deserves attention.
Lack of ClearPrecedent
Swidler marked the first time the Supreme Court specifically held the

99. Id. at 2089.
100. Id. at 2090.
101. Id. (noting also that the majority acknowledges that most cases merely presume that the privilege
survives) "[Tihe common law authority for the proposition that the privilege remains absolute after the
client's death is not a monolithic body of precedent." Id. The dissent also pointed out that opinions
directly dealing with the posthumous application of the privilege are rare. Id. Those that do directly deal
with this topic do not typically give detailed reasoning, but rather conclude that the survival of the privilege isimplied by cases construing the testamentary exception. Id.
102. A 1962 Yale Law Journal study on the importance and effect of attorney-client privilege rules
revealed "widespread misinformation concerning privileges." Zacharias, supra note 33, at 377. In particular, the Yale study showed that a significant percentage of the laypersons thought that lawyers, if
questioned in court, would have an obligation to reveal confidences. Id. at 377-78 n.123. More recently,
Zacharias conducted a survey of attorneys and laypersons that also revealed "widespread misunderstanding among clients as to the nature of confidentiality and its scope." Id. at 381. This study found that
half of the clients who relied on confidentiality wrongly assumed that the governing standard was absolute. Id. at381 n.144.
103. Zacharias warns against placing too much emphasis on either his study or the Yale study as they
are not intended to represent the country as a whole. Id. at 379. Perhaps the existence of misconceptions
about the privilege indicate that lawyers do a poor job of accurately informing clients of the privilege.
Therefore, a question remains as to whether these misconceptions demonstrate that clients do not rely on
confidentiality or whether these misconceptions are merely the product of poor counseling by attorneys.
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attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. What was once
thought to be a settled area of the law was suddenly questioned by the court
of appeals. In reversing the court of appeals, the Court was unable to cite
cases of binding precedent on this particular issue. Instead, the Court could
only cite the "presumption" of the common law to support its position. In
fact, the Court relied on the opinions of commentators to support its contention that such was the common law rule."°0
Just as the view of the common law has been presumed for many years,
the effect of the privilege in encouraging candor has also been assumed with
little or no empirical evidence to support such a claim. Intuitively, the policy of encouraging candor in the attorney-client relationship makes sense,
but allowing such an expansive privilege to obstruct the truth finding process seems untenable when there is no conclusive empirical evidence to
prove the effectiveness of the privilege."' The Court's decision did not attempt to pacify the concerns of those who doubt the effectiveness of the
privilege in encouraging candor and seemed unconcerned that there is no
empirical evidence to support the policy behind the privilege."- Faced with
this lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the privilege, the
Court was forced to rely on tradition and reason to uphold the privilege in
this case.
Despite these criticisms, the Court took this opportunity to formally
hold and express what the common law has assumed for many years. The
attorney-client privilege has become an integral part of our legal system and
has generally been viewed as protecting communications even beyond the
client's death. Any other holding by the Court may have severely disrupted
American jurisprudence. Furthermore, "although the benefits attributable to
privileges are difficult to -estimate, there is little reason to assume that they
are necessarily small."'' Instead of leaping to conclusions, the Court took
the position that the facts of this case were insufficient to overturn the
104. Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2323; Frankel, supra note 24, at

78-79; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 94 at 348). The court then noted that the commentators who
argue for abrogation of the rule beyond the client's death recognize that such action would be a modification to the common law. Id. (citing 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 23, § 199; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 emt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); 24 WRIGHT &

GRAHAM, supra note 78, § 5498).
105. Conversely, most practitioners undoubtedly have encountered clients who have expressly relied
on assurances of confidentiality before disclosing certain information. Additionally, the lack of empirical
evidence failed to convince the majority that the impact of another exception to the privilege would be
insignificant. See Swidler, 118 S.Ct. at 2088 n.4 (noting the limited empirical evidence on the privilege
and that the studies do not reach firm conclusions on whether limiting the privilege would discourage
full and frank communication). See also Zacharias, supra note 33, at 353-54 (reporting the conclusions

of a 1962 Yale study and his own study of Tompkins County, New York).
106. See Modes of Analysis, supra note 32, at 1474 (contending that empirical critiques are generally
overstated).
107. Id.
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common law rule.- While the dissent perceived a weighty need that justified breaching the privilege in this case, the majority conservatively refused
to take such a large leap from tradition.
Avoidance of PrivacyJustification
The Court took this opportunity to reaffirm the utilitarian policy justification of the attorney-client privilege. In light of the growing support the
privacy rationale has gained among commentators, one must question why
the Supreme Court avoided this justification. The avoidance of the privacy
justification becomes particularly apparent when one considers the amount
of coverage the respondent devoted to the issue in its brief."19 In particular,
the petitioners claimed "many people feel strongly that there is a zone of
privacy that should be respected even after death."' 01
The Court may have avoided the privacy justification in order to protect the attorney-client privilege from challenges by criminal defendants. If
a criminal defendant seeks exculpatory information from a deceased's attorney, the privacy justification would force the Court to choose between the
defendant's constitutional rights and the deceased's right to privacy. In such
a case, a criminal defendant's right to exculpatory evidence may trump a
decedent's right to privacy. Since the privacy rationale focuses on the right
of the individual, the existence of the privilege may once again be threatened as the quest for truth seeks to prevail over any obstacles."' "Although
privacy helps to preserve liberty, this very liberty allows the invasion of that
of others." ' A court using the privacy rationale would be forced to balance
competing individual rights, thereby relegating the privilege to protecting
inconsequential communications.'
Conversely, when the Court uses the utilitarian rationale, such balancing of rights is probably unnecessary. Several courts have prevented a
criminal defendant from accessing privileged information by justifying the

108. Swidler, 118 S.Ct. at2088.
109. See Brief for Petitioners at 10, Swidler & Berlin v.United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No.

97-1192) (noting first the utilitarian justifications of the privilege, but then arguing the privacy and
reputation concerns of the client). "There are many public people who feel, with considerable justification, that there is some information as to which the claims of privacy outweigh the claims of history." Id.
at 17. "These people [who reach an age at which thoughts of mortality intrude]---as well as others who

are suicidal or engaged in hazardous lifestyles-are entitled to consult an attorney in confidence." Id. at
18-19.
110. Id. at 18.

111. A rationale which focuses only on the rights of the individual may meet the same problems that
the oath and honor justification faced. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
112. Modes ofAnalysis, supra note 32, at 1483.
113. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 69 (criticizing the court in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357
A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) for breaching the attorney-client privilege).
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privilege using traditional utilitarian arguments.' In these cases, the criminal defendant's rights have been subverted to society's interest in ensuring
candor in the attorney-client relationship. By using the utilitarian rationale,
the Court may avoid the balancing of individual interests and instead can
hold the benefits to society outweigh the cost of concealing evidence. "[B]y
relying exclusively on the interests of people not involved in the litigation,
the justification frees itself of any taint associated with permitting particular

individuals to hide inculpatory information."'
Swidler's Impact on Wyoming Practitioners"'

The Wyoming practitioner should realize the Swidler decision is not
binding on the Wyoming Supreme Court."' In fact, the Wyoming court refused to apply the attorney-client privilege beyond the client's death in one
particular case."' While the holding of Kump may be limited to the particularly egregious facts of that case, the court relied heavily on public policy in
defining the extent of the privilege."' In particular, the court said attorney-

114. See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege should not be overridden in a case where the state sought to force the deceased's
attorney to reveal communications that may have pertained to the deceased's involvement in the death of
two individuals); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1981) (upholding the trial judge's determination
that statements made by a deceased police informant to an attorney were protected by the attorney-client
privilege and were therefore unavailable to the criminal defendant to prove an entrapment defense). The
Massachusetts court stated that "[t]he social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for client ... outweighs the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence." In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 70 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023
(Mass. 1985)). Likewise, the South Carolina court stated that "[tihe privilege is based upon a public
policy that the best interest of society is served by promoting a relationship between the attorney and the
client whereby utmost confidence in the continuing secrecy of all confidential disclosures made by the
client within the relationship is maintained." Doster,284 S.E.2d at 219.
115. Modes of Analysis, supra note 32, at 1473-74 (noting that "considering only extrinsic social
policy, the justification elevates the interest advanced by privileges to the same plane as the societal
interest in ascertaining the truth."). But see supra note 44 and accompanying text (saying that the privacy
rationale would conceal attorney-client communications regardless of necessity). Epstein also contends
that the privacy rationale gets away from balancing confidentiality and truth. EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra
note 44, at 4-5.
116. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis on how the Wyoming Supreme Court
will define the privilege under state law. It is included in this note to remind the Wyoming practitioner to
use caution when describing the scope of the attomey-client privilege under Wyoming law.
117. Under Wyoming law, the attorney client privilege is governed by the principles of common law
except as otherwise required by statute. WYo. R. EVID. 501. Under Wyoming statute, the following shall
not testify in certain respects:
An attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or
patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on
the same subject.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (Michie 1997).
118. See State v. Kump, 301 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1956) (refusing to allow a husband accused of murdering his wife to assert the attorney-client privilege to suppress the testimony of the wife's lawyer.)
119. Id at 815.
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client communications are excluded on grounds of public policy that depend
on the facts in each particular case.'20 Furthermore, the court said "[w]e can
conceive of no public policy which would exclude the communications such
as are involved in this case."''
CONCLUSION
The Court's holding is limited to finding the independent counsel did
not prove a case compelling enough to make an exception to the attorneyclient privilege. The Court validated the common law presumption that the
attorney-client privilege was applicable after the client's death. In doing so,
the Court made the proper decision to refuse to upset the privilege. The
Court affirmed the application of the privilege beyond the client's death in
ordinary cases, but left the door open to hear a case which addresses the
criminal constitutional rights issue. For now, the attorney-client privilege
remains safe from intrusions that may occur after the client's death.
While the privilege may be subject to future attacks from a criminal
defendant, the Court reinforced the position that the privilege has in our
legal system by stressing the utilitarian justification and the benefits the
privilege produces for society. By choosing the utilitarian justification
rather than the privacy rationale, the Court has enabled itself to avoid the
balancing of competing individual rights in future cases. Despite this, a case
arising with greater interests at stake may more easily upset the privilege. It
is apparent three justices would be in favor of breaching the privilege where
a criminal defendant sought exculpatory information. Since the majority
refused to address that issue, such a challenge will have to wait for another
day.
CLINT LANGER

120. Id.
121. Id.
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